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Anticipating meaningful actions in the environment is an essential
function of the brain. Such predictive mechanisms originate from
the motor system and allow for inferring actions from environ-
mental affordances, and the potential to act within a specific
environment. Using architecture, we provide a unique perspective
on the ongoing debate in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy
on whether cognition depends on movement or is decoupled from
our physical structure. To investigate cognitive processes associ-
ated with architectural affordances, we used a mobile brain/body
imaging approach recording brain activity synchronized to head-
mounted displays. Participants perceived and acted on virtual
transitions ranging from nonpassable to easily passable. We found
that early sensory brain activity, on revealing the environment and
before actual movement, differed as a function of affordances. In
addition, movement through transitions was preceded by a motor-
related negative component that also depended on affordances.
Our results suggest that potential actions afforded by an environ-
ment influence perception.
sensorimotor | predictive processing | mobile brain/body imaging |
architectural cognition | mobile EEG
The affordance of a given spatial environment—defined as theperception of possibilities for, or restraints on, an action that
the environment offers—is essential for an agent to produce
meaningful behavior. Thus, the affordance of the spatial envi-
ronment become a central concept for humans interacting with
their world. The term “affordance” was introduced by Gibson (1)
and subsequently refined by various authors, including Clark (2),
who defined it as “the possibilities for use, intervention, and
action which the physical world offers a given agent and are
determined by the ‘fit’ between the agent’s physical structure,
capacities, and skills and the action-related properties of the
environment itself.” In light of emerging theories of embodied
cognition, the perception of the environment may be dependent
on proprioceptive mechanisms. According to predictive process-
ing, a neuroscientific-based theory of embodied cognition (3–5),
motor systems, similar to perceptual processes, aim at canceling
out continuously incoming bottom-up sensory signals with top-
down predictions. In this perspective, movement emerges as a
result of an active inference that attempts to either minimize
motor trajectory prediction errors by acting, and thus perceiving
the unfolding of the predicted movement, or by changing per-
ception itself (6–8).
From the standpoint of active inference, motor systems sup-
press errors through a dynamic interchange of prediction and
action. In other words, there are two ways to minimize prediction
errors: to adjust predictions to fit the current sensory input and
to adapt the unfolding of movement to make predictions come
true. This is a unifying perspective on perception and action
suggesting that action is both perceived by and caused by per-
ception (9). Thus, action, perception, and cognition coordinate
to move the body in ways that conform to a transitional set of
expectations (10).
The claim that we seek to investigate in the present study is
that perception is rooted in action, creating an action–perception
loop informed by dynamically (top-down/bottom-up) generated
prediction errors. Ultimately, the argument is that perception is
not the sole result of sensing the physical world but unfolds as an
ongoing interaction between sensory processes and bodily actions.
Such a claim has philosophical and neuroscientific significance,
because the neural dynamics underlying perception would be in-
timately dependent on the affordances of a given environment.
To investigate this claim further, we used electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG) recordings to address the neural dynamics of ac-
tion–perception interactions through affordance manipulations
in architectural experiences. More specifically, we investigated
the affordances of transitions, which are ideal candidates due to
their dynamic nature concerning the duration of altering one
condition to another (11). Here we confine transitions to the
passage between spaces, which according to the enactivists’ pro-
posed action–perception loop will be an experience dependent on
the affordances offered by the passage itself. Because of the dy-
namic nature of architecture, an essential part of transitions and
experiencing architecture is the ability to act (12). Traditionally,
investigations of architectural experiences are phenomenological—
the description of phenomena in how experience gives access to
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a world of space and time (13–16). Such descriptions specifically
find the movement of the individual to be an expression of a
holistic experience of architecture (13, 14), linking the nature of
movement to architectural experiences (17).
Transitions in architecture depend on voluntary movement,
and thus a prerequisite for any transit is a goal, which calls for
action planning. Coarsely, three parameters compose a transi-
tion: a motivated goal, a change in the physical environment, and
the unfolding of action. All three parameters are interdepen-
dent, because reaching a goal depends on the affordance offered
by an environment and also propels the body in space, contrib-
uting to experience. Thus, architectural transitions include the
attenuation of an agent’s experience through movements and
the way in which such movements animate the body through
environmental changes.
Data from neuroscientific experiments addressing this issue
might contribute to discussions centered on philosophical ques-
tions on how we relate to the world. For a long time, enactivists
implicated the reciprocal dependency of the living organism as a
self-organized living system and the embedded body in a world
for cognition (18–20). Enactivism is rooted in phenomenology
(12, 21), similar to prominent architectural theorists who put
body, action, and cognition central to experience. Active in-
ference is closely related to enactivism, in the sense that we act to
perceive, and vice versa. Such a thesis rests on a hierarchical and
dynamic model of the world, which temporally dissociates lower
sensorimotor inferences from higher motivated goals as fast and
slow, respectively (22). Fast lower sensorimotor inferences depict
processes of affordances, which thus must be present in early
stages of perception. Hierarchical affordance competition (HAC)
(23) takes the temporal aspect of affordances much further by
suggesting that cortical activity relates to the immediate decision
of action selection, which occurs fluently during movement. Such
an account of temporally extended affordances is in accordance
with active inferences.
To investigate the impact of environmental affordances on
early sensory processing in actively transiting humans, we used a
mobile brain/body imaging (MoBI) approach (24–26), recording
brain activity with EEG synchronized to movement recordings
and head-mounted virtual reality (VR). This approach allows for
the investigation of brain dynamics of participants perceiving an
environment and the transitions contained therein, as well as brain
dynamics during the transitions themselves. Previous studies in-
vestigating event-related potential (ERP) activity in stationary
participants demonstrated slow cortical potentials to indicate
anticipative motor behavior (overview in ref. 27). Known motor-
related cortical potential (MRCP) components include the read-
iness potential (28), contingent negative variation, and stimulus-
preceding negativity (29), which can be seen as indicators of
predictive behavior (30). MRCPs are negative-going waveforms
preceding an actual or imagined motor execution. However, these
negative components are associated with multiple processes, in-
cluding sensory, cognitive, and motor systems.
Bozzacchi et al. (31) attempted to measure the affordances of
a physical object by evaluating whether the anticipated conse-
quence of action itself influences the brain activity preceding a
self-paced action. They compared MRCPs of situations in which
it was possible to reach out and grasp a cup versus situations in
which it was made impossible to grasp the cup by tying the hands
of the participant. A motor execution was forced at all times. In
situations where it was impossible to grasp the cup, the authors
reported an absence of early activity over the parietal cortex and
found instead increased activity over the prefrontal cortex. The
results were interpreted as reflecting an awareness of the in-
ability to execute a goal-oriented action.
Closely related to MRCPs is the postimperative negative
variation (PINV), a negative-going waveform present following
an imperative stimulus. The PINV, which reflects the immediate
motor execution related to onset of an imperative stimulus, has
been observed during experiments investigating learned help-
lessness or loss of control (32, 33). Thus, the PINV allows the
linkage of MRCPs to the readiness to act (34).
If an enactive account of perception, action, and cognition is
correct, then affordances are intimately related to higher hierar-
chical levels through low-level perceptual cues. Such an account
would situate the processing of affordances at a similar stage as
early perceptual processes and should reveal differences in sensory
and motor-related ERPs associated with the perceived affordance
of an environment. To investigate whether brain activity is altered
depending on affordances offered by the environment, we pre-
sented human observers with environmental stimuli that allowed
or prohibited a transition from one room to the next. To this end,
the participants were presented with a view into a room containing
one door of different widths, allowing or prohibiting a transition
into the next room and thus providing different affordances. We
expected to find differences in cortical responses to covary as a
function of affordances over sensory and motor areas. In addition,
we expected to see differences in MRCPs as a function of the
environmental affordances when the participants walked through
the door or remained in the same room.
Methods
Participants. Twenty participants (9 females) with no history of neurologic
pathologies were recruited from a participant pool of the Technical Uni-
versity of Berlin, Germany. All participants provided signed informed consent
expressing knowledge of the experimental protocol, which was approved by
the Ethics Committee of the Technical University of Berlin. Participants re-
ceived either monetary compensation (10 V/h) or accredited course hours.
The mean age of participants was 28.1 y (σ = 6.2 y). All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and none had a specific background in
architecture (no architects or architectural students). One participant was
excluded due to technical issues of the experimental setup.
Paradigm Description. The experiment was conducted at Berlin Mobile Brain/
Body Imaging Laboratories (BeMoBIL) in an experimental rooms with an area
of 160 m2. The size of the virtual space was 9 m × 5 m, with room sizes of
4.5 m × 5 m for the first room and 4.5 m × 5 m for the second room. The
participants performed a forewarned (S1-S2) Go/NoGo paradigm (pseudor-
andomized 50/50) in the VR environment that required them to walk from
one room to a second room. Doors of different widths, ranging from un-
passable (20 cm, Narrow) to passable (100 cm, Mid) to easily passible
(1,500 cm, Wide), manipulated the transition affordance between rooms.
The experiment was a 3 × 2 repeated-measures design including the
factors door width (Narrow, Mid, Wide; pseudorandomized) and movement
instruction (Go, NoGo). A total of 240 trials per participant were collected,
with 40 trials for each of the factor levels. In one trial, the participants
started in a dark environment on a predefined starting square (Fig. 1). After
a random intertrial interval (mean = 3 s, σ = 1 s), the “lights” were turned
on, and the participants faced a room with a closed door. The participants
were instructed to wait (mean = 6 s, σ = 1 s) for a color change of the door,
with a change to green indicating a Go trial and a change to red indicating a
NoGo trial. In the case of a green door, the participants walked toward the
door, which slid aside. On entering the subsequent space, the participants
were instructed to find and virtually touch a red rotating circle using the
controller. The circle informed the participants that they had earned an-
other 0.1 V for their basic reimbursement of 10 V/h. After each trial, the
participants were asked to provide an emotional rating of their state irre-
spective of whether they transitioned through the door (Go condition) or
remained in the same room (NoGo condition) without transition. To this
end, the participants were instructed to go back to the starting square and
complete a virtual Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) questionnaire, using a
laser pointer from the controller, and subsequently engage the response
button located at the pointer finger to turn the lights off. The lights then
turned back on automatically to start the next trial.
In Go trials, the participants were instructed to walk toward the door and
into the second room even if the door was too narrow to pass. This was done
to control for motor execution in the Go condition and to allow movement
toward the goal irrespective of the affordance (passable vs. unpassable). A
narrow opening was thus different from a NoGo trial, in the sense that a
NoGo trial did not require any movement toward the door, whereas a Go
2 of 10 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1900648116 Djebbara et al.
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trial always required approaching the door. When a participant touched the
surrounding walls, the walls turned, indicating that the participant failed to
pass and thus must return to the start square, complete the virtual SAM, and
start the next trial.
Participants would quickly notice that the narrow door (20 cm) was im-
possible to pass without producing the warning feedback that they have
failed to pass, and yet they were required to try passing. All participants
underwent a training phase to become accustomed to the VR environment
and the different conditions. The experimenter observed the participants
from a control room, separated from the experimental space, using two
cameras and a mirrored display of the VR environment to reduce interactions
to a minimum during the experiments.
Subjective and Behavioral Data. To investigate the subjective experience of
the task, we introduced the participants to a virtual SAM questionnaire after
each trial. The SAM is a pictorial assessment of pleasure, arousal, and
dominance on a 5-point Likert scale (27). The manikin display ranges from
smiling to frowning (pleasure), from a dot in the stomach to an explosion
(arousal), and from being very small to very big (dominance). Participants
were asked to self-assess their current state after each trial. Furthermore,
regarding behavioral measures, we recorded the reaction time from the
onset of the Go stimulus (door color change) to reaching the opening
threshold itself, to assess the behavior. The data were analyzed using
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the width of the doors as a repeated-
measures factor. In the case of violation of normality and homogeneity,
corrected P values are reported. For post hoc analysis, the data were con-
trasted using Tukey’s honest significant differences (HSD) test.
EEG Recording and Data Analysis. We investigated the impact of transitional
affordances on human cognition and brain dynamics using a MoBI approach
(24–26, 28) recording human brain dynamics in participants actively tran-
sitioning through virtual rooms. All data streams were recorded and syn-
chronized using LabStreamingLayer (35). Participants wore a backpack,
which held a high-performance gaming computer to render the VR envi-
ronment (Zotac; PC Partner Limited) attached to two batteries and an EEG
amplifier system. We combined a Windows Mixed Reality (WMR; 2.89″,
2,880 × 1,440 resolution, update rate at 90 Hz, 100° field of view with a
weight of 440 g, linked to the Zotac computer through HDMI) headset and
one controller (Acer) to display and interact with the virtual environment
based on Unity (Fig. 2). Events for recordings of performance and physio-
logical data were triggered by the position of the participant in the tracking
space or by the respective response buttons of the remote control. Specific
events, such as touching the wall, all button presses, transitioning through
the door, answering the questionnaire, and all cases of “lights on” (and
A
B
C
Fig. 1. (A) Participants are instructed to stand in the start square. A black sphere restricts their vision to pure black for 3 s (σ = 1 s). The moment the black
sphere disappears, participants perceive the door they have to pass. They wait for the imperative stimulus, either a green door (Go) or a red door (NoGo), for
6 s (σ = 1 s). In the case of Go, participants were instructed to pass the opening, virtually touch the red circle (which in turn releases a monetary bonus), return
to the start square, and complete the virtual SAM questionnaire. In the case of NoGo, participants were instructed to turn around and complete the virtual
SAM questionnaire. (B) The three different doors had the following dimensions: Narrow, 0.2 m; Mid, 1 m; Wide, 1.5 m. Note the color code for each door as
used throughout the paper. (C) Diagrammatic timeline depicting the sequences of events for a single trial in a conceptual manner.
Djebbara et al. PNAS Latest Articles | 3 of 10
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“lights off”), were synchronized with the recorded brain activity and the
presented VR environment through LabStreamingLayer.
EEG data were acquired continuously with a 64-channel EEG system
(eegoSports, ANT Neuro), sampled at 500 Hz. Impedances were kept below
10 kΩ. The computational delay generated by the interaction of ANT Neuro
software, Windows Mixed Reality, and Unity was measured as 20 ms (σ =
4 ms), which was taken into account during the analysis by subtracting the
average delay from each event latency. With a jitter of 4 ms, we considered
the delay to have little to no impact on the ERPs. Offline analysis was con-
ducted using MATLAB (MathWorks) and the EEGLAB toolbox (36). The raw
data were bandpass-filtered between 1 Hz and 100 Hz and down-sampled to
250 Hz. Channels with more than five SDs from the joint probability of the
recorded electrodes were removed and subsequently interpolated. The
datasets were then re-referenced to an average reference and adaptive
mixture independent component analysis (ICA) (37) was computed on the
remaining rank of the data using one model with online artifact rejection in
five iterations. The resultant ICA spheres and weights matrices were trans-
ferred to the raw dataset that was preprocessed using the identical pre-
processing parameters as for the ICA dataset, except for the filtering, which
used a bandpass filter from 0.2 Hz to 40 Hz. Subsequently, independent
components reflecting eye movements (i.e., blinks and horizontal move-
ments) were removed manually based on their topographic, spectral, and
temporal characteristics.
Epochs were created time-locked to the onset of the room including the
closed door (lights on) from −500 ms before to 1,500 ms after stimulus onset
for Narrow, Mid, and Wide door trials. Similarly, another set of epochs was
time-locked to the second Go/NoGo stimulus from −500 ms before to
1,000 ms after onset of the stimulus for Narrow, Mid, and Wide door trials.
On average, 15% (σ = 10.8) of all epochs were automatically rejected when
they deviated by >5 SDs from the joint probability and distribution of the
activity of all recorded electrodes.
The visual evoked potentials and MRCPs were analyzed at central midline
electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, POz, and Oz) covering all relevant locations, in-
cluding the visual cortex and the motor cortex, as reported previously (31,
38). Because stimuli were distributed across the complete visual field and
participants walked through the virtual spaces, we did not expect to see any
lateralization of ERPs. All channels were analyzed; however, only three
channels (FCz, Pz, and Oz) are discussed here, according to findings reported
by Bozzacchi et al. (31). The analysis results of all six channels are provided in
SI Appendix. For peak analysis of the P1-N1 complex, the grand average
peaks were estimated, and individual peaks were defined as the maximum
positive peak and negative peak in the time window surrounding the grand
average P1 and N1 peaks (±10 ms from the peak), respectively. An automatic
peak detection algorithm detected the peaks in the averaged epochs for
each participant. Multiple peaks were detected and systematically weighted
depending on the magnitude, the distance to the grand average peak la-
tency as determined by visual inspection of grand average ERP, and the
polarity. The algorithm is provided in SI Appendix. For anterior N140 and
posterior P140, by visual inspection of the grand average ERPs, the estimated
grand average latency was 140 ms, with a search window for individual
peaks ranging from 50 to 200 ms. For the anterior P215 and posterior N215,
the estimated grand average peak latency was 215 ms, with a search win-
dow for individual peaks ranging from 140 to 290 ms.
Mean peak amplitudes were analyzed by 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA
using the door width (Narrow, Mid, or Wide) and electrode as repeated
measures. The results descriptions focus on the visual evoked P140 compo-
nent at posterior electrodes (Pz, POz, and Oz) and the N140 component at
frontal leads (Fz, FCz, and Cz) based on separate ANOVAs. For the N215 and
P215 components at posterior electrodes (Pz, POz, and Oz) and frontal leads
(Fz, FCz, and Cz), separate ANOVAs were computed in the time range of
140–290 ms. For the later motor-related potentials, an ANOVA was com-
puted for the mean amplitude in the range of 600–800 ms. The data were
analyzed using a 2 × 3 × 6 factorial repeated-measures ANOVA with the
factors imperative stimulus (Go and NoGo), door width (Narrow, Mid, and
Wide), and electrode location (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, POz, and Oz) within the time
window (600–800 ms). For post hoc analysis, the data were contrasted using
Tukey’s HSD. In cases of violation of sphericity, corrected P values are
reported. All ANOVAs were computed as linear mixed models.
Results
We obtained subjective, behavioral, and electrophysiological data,
with a focus on electrophysiology. All data underwent statistical
processing and are presented here in the order processed.
Subjective Data: SAM Ratings. The SAM questionnaire was com-
pleted for Go or NoGo and for all door conditions. A 2 ×
3 factorial repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors imper-
ative stimulus (Go and NoGo) and door width (Narrow,Mid, and
Wide) for each emotional dimension of the SAM questionnaire
revealed differences in the main effect for width in Arousal
(F2,90 = 3.35, P = 0.0393, η2 = 0.048), Dominance (F2,90 = 10.03,
P < 0.0001, η2 = 0.138), and Valence (F2,90 = 5.31, P = 0.0065, η2 =
0.073). For the imperative stimulus, differences were found for
Arousal (F1,90 = 36.81, P < 0.0001, η2 = 0.266), Dominance (F1,90 =
25.26, P < 0.0001, η2 = 0.173), and Valence (F1,90 = 28.59, P <
0.0001, η2 = 0.196). Interaction effects revealed significant differ-
ences for Dominance (F2,90 = 4.14, P = 0.0189, η2 = 0.056) and
Valence (F2,90 = 7.04, P = 0.0014, η2 = 0.096) but only tendencies
for Arousal (F2,90 = 0.92, P = 0.4000, η2 = 0.0134). Post hoc con-
trasts using Tukey’s HSD test (Fig. 3) showed no significant dif-
ferences for NoGo in Arousal but identified significant differences
for Go between Narrow × Mid (P = 0.0386). For NoGo in Domi-
nance, no significant differences were revealed as opposed to Go
for Narrow × Wide (P < 0.0001), Mid × Wide (P = 0.0335), and
Narrow × Mid (P < 0.0345). Similarly, for valence, in Go significant
differences were revealed for Narrow ×Mid (P = 0.0326), Narrow ×
Wide (P < 0.0001), with a tendency seen for Mid × Wide
(P = 0.0625).
Behavioral Data: Door Approaching Times. This analysis was possi-
ble only for Go trials, as it required actually approaching the
door. The time it took participants from the Go stimulus to pass
the door was calculated using one-way ANOVA with repeated
measures for different door widths, which revealed a significant
difference in door widths (F2,36 = 6.07, P < 0.0053, η
2 = 0.232;
Fig. 4). Post hoc comparison with Tukey’s HSD test showed no
significant differences in behavior when approaching the Narrow
doors compared with the Mid doors (P = 0.3073), but had a
tendency to be slower when approaching Mid doors compared
with Wide doors (P = 0.1312) and a significant difference be-
tween approaching Narrow doors compared with Wide doors
Fig. 2. MoBI setup. The participants wore a backpack, carrying a high-
performance gaming computer (Zotac, cyan), powered by two batteries
(red). An EEG amplifier (ANT eegoSports, yellow) was attached to the
backpack and connected to the computer. The participants wore a VR head-
mounted display (Windows Mixed Reality) on top of a 64-channel cap. This
setup allowed participants to move freely around while recording data.
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(P = 0.0038), with significantly faster approach times for the
Wide door condition.
Electrophysiology: Early ERP.
Posterior P140.With onset of the lights that allowed participants to
see the room including the door (i.e., lights on), the ERPs clearly
demonstrated a P1-N1 complex that was most pronounced over
the occipital midline electrode, with a first positive component
around 140 ms, followed by a negative peak around 210 ms (Fig.
5; all six channels shown in SI Appendix, Fig. S1). At the frontal
midline electrode, this pattern was inverted, and a negative
component around 140 ms was followed by a positive peak ob-
served around 215 ms. The 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA on
P140 amplitudes for posterior channels revealed significant main
effects for both door width (F2,108 = 8.163, P = 0.005, η
2 = 0.096)
and channel (F2,36 = 15.868, P < 0.0001, η
2 = 0.187). The in-
teraction effect was not significant (F4,108 = 1.669, P = 0.1624).
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test revealed signifi-
cant differences in peak amplitudes at channel Oz between
Narrow and Mid transitions (P = 0.0021) and between Narrow
and Wide transitions (P = 0.0065) and at channel POz between
Narrow and Wide transitions (P = 0.028).
Posterior N215. The 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA on
N215 amplitudes for posterior channels revealed a significant
main effect for the factor door width (F2,108 = 4.348, P = 0.0153,
η2 = 0.066) but no significant impact for the factor channels
(F2,36 = 0.0893, P = 0.9147, η
2 = 0.001). Post hoc Tukey HSD
contrasts revealed no significant differences for Pz and POz.
However, similar to posterior P140, significant differences at Oz
for the comparison of Narrow and Mid transitions (P = 0.0113)
and for the comparison of Narrow and Wide transitions (P =
0.0372) were found (Fig. 6).
Anterior P215. An inverse pattern was observed for amplitudes
over anterior leads, with a main effect of door width that differed
depending on the affordances (F2,108 = 11.071, P < 0.0001, η
2 =
0.139). The main effect of channels also reached significance
(F2,36 = 5.3627, P = 0.0092, η
2 = 0.067). Tukey HSD contrasts
revealed significant differences only between Narrow and Wide
transitions for FCz (P = 0.0071) and Cz (P = 0.0214), with a
tendency at Fz (P = 0.0717). The interaction was not significant.
Anterior N140. The 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA on
N140 amplitudes for anterior channels revealed no significant
main effect for the factor door width (F2,108 = 1.823, P = 0.1663,
η2 = 0.024). In contrast, the main effect of channels reached
significance (F2,108 = 8.109, P = 0.0012, η
2 = 0.107). The in-
teraction did not reach significance.
EEG–motor-related processes. After onset of the imperative stimu-
lus, a positive peak at anterior leads and a negative peak at
posterior leads were observed. For the sake of brevity, this po-
tential complex is referred to as the early postimperative com-
plex (EPIC). Reflecting its similar cortical polarity to the P1-
N1 complex, the EPIC was analyzed in a similar way, separating
anterior leads (Fz, FCz, and Cz) from posterior leads (Pz, POz,
and Oz), and detecting single peaks in individual averages.
Anterior EPIC. A 2 × 3 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed
significant differences in the main effect for widths (F2,270 = 4.21,
P = 0.0157, η2 = 0.025), imperative stimulus (F1,270 = 23.66, P <
0.0001, η2 = 0.071), and channel (F2,36 = 6.70, P = 0.0033, η
2 =
0.040). No interaction effect was observed. The post hoc Tukey’s
HSD test revealed no significant differences between the transi-
tion widths for the various channels and for the imperative stimuli.
Posterior EPIC. The identical ANOVA for the posterior potentials
of the EPIC revealed no significant impact of transition width
(F2,270 = 2.001, P = 0.1371, η
2 = 0.013) or imperative stimulus
(F1,270 = 2.30, P = 0.1298, η
2 = 0.007). Significant differences in
EPIC amplitudes were observed for the factor channel (F2,36 =
5.45, P = 0.0085, η2 = 0.035). Because topographical differences
were not the focus of this study, no further post hoc contrasts
were computed. No interaction was significant.
PINV. In the preparation time before the onset of the door color
change, indicating that the participant was either to walk through
the door or remain in the same room, we observed no systematic
negative going waveform as reported in previous studies (29, 39).
However, after the onset of the color change, a pronounced
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Fig. 3. Boxplot of the SAM questionnaire results for the three different SAM
scales (Arousal, Dominance, and Valence) as a function of the door width (Narrow,
Mid, or Wide). (Left) Pictorial representation of the SAM manikin for the highest
value of each condition presented. (Middle) SAM ratings for the Go condition.
(Right) SAM ratings for the NoGo condition. Means are indicated by dashed lines;
medians, by solid lines. ▪P < 0.1, *P < 0.05, and ***P < 0.001; ns, not significant.
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Fig. 4. Raincloud plot of approach times for each door width condition.
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD test. Means are indicated by dashed
lines; medians, by solid lines. **P < 0.01; ns, not significant.
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positivity, the EPIC, followed by a long-lasting negative wave-
form over frontocentral locations was observed in the ERP (Fig.
7 ; all six channels shown in SI Appendix, Fig. S2). This negative
waveform resembled a PINV, as described previously (32, 34,
40). The PINV component was observed at 600–800 ms after the
imperative stimulus (color change of the door) and varied as a
function of the affordance of the environment (door width). A
global 2 × 3 × 6 factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was com-
puted to analyze the MRCPs using Go/NoGo, width, and channel
as repeated measures. ANOVA revealed significant differences in
the main effect for Go/NoGo (F1,540 = 19.54, P < 0.0001, η
2 =
0.039) and for channel (F5,90 = 16.69, P < 0.0001, η
2 = 0.112).
Significant differences were reported for the interaction effect of
Go/NoGo × channel (F5,540 = 5.25, P = 0.0001, η
2 = 0.035) and for
width × channel (F10,540 = 2.61, P = 0.0042, η
2 = 0.035). A ten-
dency toward an interaction of the factors Go/NoGo × Width
(F2,540 = 2.33, P = 0.0975, η
2 = 0.006) was observed.
Post hoc contrasts using Tukey’s HSD test revealed significant
differences only for the Go condition as opposed to the NoGo
condition (Fig. 8). Similar to the early evoked potentials, dif-
ferences were observed only at frontal and occipital sites and
between Narrow and Mid doors over FCz (P = 0.0059) and Oz
(P < 0.0001), as well as between Narrow and Wide doors at FCz
(P = 0.0323) and Oz (P < 0.0001). No differences were observed
between the Mid and Wide doors (SI Appendix, Fig. S3).
Discussion
The main goal of this study was to assess whether brain activity is
altered depending on the affordances offered by the environ-
ment. If this were the case, then affordances should systemati-
cally modulate behavior and brain activity. Specifically, we
hypothesized that perceptual processes would covary with the
environmental affordances, leading to behavioral changes, and
that MRCPs would vary as a function of affordances.
SAM and Approach Time. The analysis of subjective ratings
revealed significant differences among Go trials but no differ-
ences across NoGo trials for all ratings. Notably, in cases of
NoGo, all participants perceived a similar scene standing in front
of a red (NoGo) door, turning around, and answering the virtual
SAM. Varying door sizes for Go trials yielded differences for
Dominance, with Narrow doors more dominant than Mid doors
and even more dominant than Wide doors. The increase in
Dominance for Narrow doors is inversely reflected in Valence
because we observed increasing values with increasing door
widths. Regarding Arousal, participants reported less arousal for
Narrow doors compared with Mid and Wide doors. Furthermore,
it is noteworthy that Dominance for NoGo is relatively high in
value compared with NoGo in Arousal and Valence, which score
low and central values, respectively. Taken together, these
findings indicate that subjective reports differ significantly
depending on whether participants who received a Go actively
moved through the rooms, implying an impact of action affective
ratings of an environment. However, our findings should be
considered with caution, as the subjective ratings might have
been influenced by several factors beyond affordance, including
monetary reward, different trial durations, physical activity, and
varying skills of subjective/introspective emotional evaluation.
Thus, performance data might provide a better basis for
interpreting the impact of affordances on behavior. The time it
took participants to reach the door after the onset of the im-
perative color change varied according to the environmental
affordance. Participants approached the Wide doors nearly sig-
nificantly faster and significantly faster than the Mid and Narrow
doors, respectively, while there was no significant difference
betweenMid and Narrow transitions. While theWide door clearly
offered a passage without greater demands regarding the motor
plan and execution, theMid door width, being ambiguously wide/
narrow, might have triggered motor processes simulating a tran-
sition to estimate whether the door was passable. In this sense, the
Mid and Narrow doors, causing uncertainty, might have delayed
approach times due to increased processing demands. Admittedly,
results derived from the approach time are limited, due in part to
fatigue from performing a physically demanding task for a rela-
tively long period, and in part to passing a door that is seemingly
impossible to pass. This led participants to develop different ap-
proach strategies, such as twisting their bodies, peeking inside
from different angles, or walking directly into the virtual wall to
trigger a failed attempt, causing different delays. Given that no
participant was told beforehand that one opening was impassable,
participants’ enthusiasm and creativity diminished over the course
of the trials when they learned that it was the Narrow door.
However, the fact that participants in general spent significantly
more time approaching the Narrow doors compared with Wide
doors provides sufficient guidance for the analyses of cortical
measures associated with these differences.
Cortical Measures.
Early evoked potentials. As an initial insight into the association of
affordances and cortical potentials, we analyzed the early visual-
evoked potentials. We expected to find differences in the stimulus-
locked ERP at occipital channels, reflecting differences in sensory
processing of affordance-related aspects of the transition. Based on
the assumption of fast sensorimotor active inferences that should
Fig. 5. Three time-locked ERPs (FCz, Pz, and Oz) at the onset of the lights on
event. The Narrow condition is in yellow, the Mid condition is in blue, and
the Wide condition is in red. Two time windows are indicated with dashed
lines and a gray transparent box. The first time window (50–200 ms) marks
the anterior N140 and posterior P140, while the second window (140–
290 ms) marks the anterior P215 and posterior N215. The components are
marked with arrows.
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be reflected in action-directed stimulus processing influencing not
only sensory activity, but also motor-related activity, we hypothe-
sized that we would also find differences in the ERP over motor
areas in the same time window as sensory potentials (i.e., between
50 and 200 ms). As illustrated in the analysis, we found significant
differences in amplitudes of the visually evoked P140 component
over the central occipital electrode varying with the affordance of
the transition. In addition, and in line with our hypothesis, we also
found a difference over frontocentral leads starting around 50 ms
and lasting until 200 ms after onset of the door display. Taken
together, these findings indicate that no significant differences in
peak amplitudes were found between the passable Mid and Wide
doors, while peak amplitudes associated with both door widths
significantly differed from those of the impassable Narrow doors.
Note that the visual scene of the three doors was comparable,
as they contained the same physical contrasts in the Go and the
NoGo condition. In addition, being merely introduced to the
environmental setting, participants did not know whether they
would have to attempt to pass. These results indicate that impass-
able doors with poor affordances produce significantly different
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Fig. 6. (A) Posterior P140. Raincloud plot of detected mean amplitude of the positive peak in the time-locked lights on event in the time range of 50–200 ms
for Pz, POz, and Oz. Means are indicated by dashed lines; medians, by solid lines. The significance was calculated using Tukey’s HSD test. We observed
significant differences for Oz in Narrow ×Mid (P = 0.0021) and Narrow ×Wide (P = 0.0065), while POz in Narrow × Wide revealed a significant difference (P =
0.028); however, no significant differences were observed in other electrodes and other contrasts. (B) Posterior N215. Raincloud plot of detected mean
amplitude of the negative peak in the time-locked lights on event in the time range of 140–290 ms for Pz, POz, and Oz. We observed significant differences
only for Oz in Narrow ×Mid (P = 0.0113) and Narrow ×Wide (P = 0.0372). (C) Anterior N140. Raincloud plot of detected mean amplitude of the negative peak
in the time-locked lights on event in the time range of 50–200 ms for Fz, FCz, and Cz. We observed no significant differences for any electrode. (D) Anterior
P215. Raincloud plot of detected mean amplitude of negative peak in the time-locked lights on event in the time range of 140–290 ms for Fz, FCz, and Cz. We
observed significant differences in all channels in Narrow × Wide, with the exception of only a tendency in Fz (P = 0.0717), FCz (P = 0.0071), and Cz (P =
0.0214). (E) Double plot. Frontal (dashed line) and posterior (solid line) time-locked ERPs (Fz and Oz) at the onset of the lights on event. The Narrow condition
is in yellow, the Mid condition is in blue, and the Wide condition is in red. Two time windows are indicated with dashed lines and a gray transparent box.
The first time window (50–200 ms) marks the anterior N140 and posterior P140, while the second window (140–290 ms) marks the anterior P215 and
posterior N215. ▪P < 0.1, *P < 0.05, and **P < 0.01; ns, not significant.
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early evoked potentials compared with passable doors, particu-
larly at the frontocentral and occipital sites. Thus, environmental
affordances, in terms of being able to program a trajectory to
transit spaces, yield a significant measurable effect on early cor-
tical potentials best pronounced over frontal and occipital sites at
∼200 ms after the first view of the environment.
Considering the affordance-specific pattern observed for the
early P1-N1 complex, previous studies have shown that this
visual-evoked potential complex reflects attentional processes
associated with spatial or feature-based aspects of stimuli (41–
45). Attended stimuli elicit larger P1-N1 amplitudes than un-
attended stimuli. Based on these findings, our results suggest
that passable transitions were associated with increased atten-
tional processing. Keeping this in mind, when viewing the
affordance-specific pattern of the P1-N1 complex in light of ac-
tive inferences (46), the difference confirms the assumption that
perceptual processes covary with environmental affordances. In
this sense, the amplitude difference might be credited to the
process of actively inferring whether the body can move and
transit at all, implying that visual attention is also guided by
action-related properties of the environment. Similar to HAC
(23) and active inference (22, 47), these findings are in line with
parallel cortical processes integrating sensory information to
specify currently available affordances.
How one might act on the environment is an ongoing process
of resolving affordances, taking place as early as perceptual pro-
cesses, which situates actions in an intimate position with percep-
tion. Such early processes are deeply involved in the conception
Fig. 7. Three time-locked ERPs (FCz, Pz, and Oz) at the onset of Go/NoGo.
The Narrow condition is in yellow, theMid condition is in blue, and theWide
condition is in red. The time window, indicated with dashed lines and a gray
transparent box, illustrates the selected time window for analyzing the
MRCP by a global 2 × 3 × 6 factorial repeated-measures ANOVA. The an-
terior and posterior PINV are marked with arrows.
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Fig. 8. Raincloud plots of mean amplitude of negative development in the
time-locked event of Go/NoGo in the time range of 600–800 ms for FCz, Pz,
and Oz. Means are indicated by dashed lines; medians, by solid lines. The
Tukey HSD contrast revealed differences only in FCz and Oz, between
Narrow × Mid for FCz (P = 0.0059) and Oz (P < 0.0001) and between
Narrow × Wide for FCz (P = 0.0323) and Oz (P < 0.0001). No differences were
observed for NoGo. *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, and ***P < 0.001; ns, not significant.
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and articulation of the environment for an agent, pointing toward
the importance of movement in cognition, and of how an agent
continuously enacts the world.
Motor-related potentials. Although the ERP plots indicated an
affordance trend of the EPIC, statistical tests revealed no sig-
nificant differences. However, the Narrow door width elicited the
greatest amplitude in both anterior positivity and posterior
negativity. The increased amplitude associated with Narrow
transitions can be interpreted as a reflection of the body simply
not fitting, producing a prediction error because one is forced to
interact with the transition. The nature of the PINV component
has not been as well investigated as other ERP components,
limiting the reliability of an interpretation. Some studies treat
this component as modality-unspecific “electrocortical correlate
of a cognitive state” (48). Gauthier and Gottesmann (49) hy-
pothesized that the PINV, similar to affordances, acts as a
marker of change in the psychophysiological state. Subsequently,
the PINV has been used to investigate depression, schizophrenia,
learned helplessness, and loss of control (32–34, 50, 51). De-
pressive and schizophrenic individuals exhibit an increased PINV
that is explained as an increased vulnerability for loss of control,
as well as increased anticipation for future events (32, 34, 40). It
must be emphasized that affordances reflect actions directed
toward the future. If an increased PINV reflects increased vul-
nerability for future events, as we observed for impassable doors,
then the component might shed new light on the intentionality in
affordances. Given the intention to pass, yet being deprived of
doing so, seems to be reflected in the PINV. Casement et al. (34)
suggested the PINV depends on lack of control as the state of
having no influence, depriving the potential to act. This could
explain the difference in the Narrow condition, as participants
were instructed to attempt to pass at all times until failure, even
for impassable openings, leading to a sense of loss of control.
Only in cases of Go did we observe a difference in the PINV
component, which varied with the environmental affordances.
Amplitudes of the component for Narrow doors differed signif-
icantly different from those for Mid and Wide doors, while the
passable conditions did not differ among the doors. Further-
more, there were no significant differences in the PINV com-
ponent in cases of NoGo, emphasizing the importance of the
motor execution itself in evoking the PINV component. These
results point toward the PINV component as an expression of
the readiness to interact with the designed environment (i.e., less
negative for passable doors and more negative for impassable
doors), thus serving as a potential marker for the readiness to act
given environmental affordances. Our results are also consistent
with the observed increase in activity over frontocentral sites
reported by Bozzacchi et al. (31), who concluded that the
meaning of the action and awareness of being able to act—
affordances—affect action preparation, which is here understood
as the motor-related potential before movement onset. We argue
that the PINV component might reflect a readiness aspect of
affordances. This would mean that the PINV is not modulated by
the perception that the door is different visual information, but
reveals something about the readiness to act. For this reason, we
find significant differences in cases of Go but not in cases of
NoGo, and also for passable compared with impassable.
In light of HAC (23), a potential explanation for the absence
of differences in the NoGo trials is related to the immediate
action selection, which in all cases (Narrow, Mid, and Wide) is a
simple turn to answer the questionnaire, and thus the task pre-
sents the participant with identical affordances. When instead
given a Go, cortical processes require an action selection related
to the anticipated motor trajectory, which differs according to
the affordances of the door width. HAC suggests the higher
levels bias the lower-level competitions, which operate at the
level of action itself, through a cascade of expected next affor-
dances. The lower levels have a continuous competition of how
to satisfy the higher expectations. Action selection, executed
while unfolding the planned movements in a continuous manner,
depends on the expectation of next affordances.
Of note, regarding architectural experience, because the
PINV component was expressed only in the Go condition (i.e.,
forced interaction with the environment), these findings sup-
port the importance of movement for architectural experience,
in a sense that action or even only the perception of action
possibilities alters brain activity. Visually guiding and pro-
pelling the body in space greatly influences the continuous
emerging of affordances, which in turn affect the human ex-
perience. We found differences in frontocentral and occipital
areas before movement through space, with the post-
imperative negative-going waveform most pronounced over
FCz indicating involvement of the supplementary motor area
(SMA), as reported by Bozzacchi et al. (31). Previous studies
showed involvement of the SMA in visually guided actions
(52), which is the essence of active inferences. The PINV can
be generated independently from the reafferent signal, which
is, in terms of active inference, understood as ascending
(bottom-up) proprioceptive prediction errors (53). This sug-
gests that the PINV component might reflect descending
(top-down) predictions, making the SMA an essential area of
the action–perception loop and thus crucial for processing
continuous affordances. This might resolve the finding of
frontocentral differences in Go trials only. The SMA is ana-
tomically bridging the frontal cortex with the motor cortex—
perhaps also functionally, as argued by Adams et al. (53),
because this anatomical nature fits with the proposed hierar-
chical characteristics of forward and backward projections in
active inferences.
Using VR to investigate cortical processes has its natural
limitations, such as the absence of a physical body. Regarding the
sense of body, which is at stake in the present study, it has been
suggested that VR “may offer new embodied ways for assessing
the functioning of the brain by directly targeting the processes
behind real-world behaviors” (54), which is remarkably valid for
the present study. Riva et al. (54) argued that the brain’s pre-
dictive capability immerses the body, and thus related processes,
if the visual perception is in line with the body’s actions, for in-
stance, by head movements and wandering. Through a process of
trial and error, the brain and body adjust to VR. Furthermore, in
terms of architecture, VR as a head-mounted display (55) and as
a CAVE system (56) has been integrated into studies with bodily
and environmental interests, yielding comparable results. How-
ever, VR in combination with neuroscientific methods remains a
newer technique and thus must be used with care. It must be
emphasized that the purpose of VR in the current experimental
setup was to isolate and control the factor of interest. Future
studies using MoBI in real-world environments are needed to
investigate whether the results from VR can be generalized to
the real world.
Conclusion
The present study provides strong evidence for affordances to be
processed as early as perceptual processes, linking action and
perception in a similar manner to active inference. The results
point toward a conception of the brain that seems to deal with
“how can I act” while in parallel processes referring to “what do I
perceive” take place. These results thus support the assumption
that perception of the environment is influenced by affordances
and action itself, and thus affordances and action can influence
the experience of an environment. Given the importance of
affordances and action for brain dynamics, this further emphasizes
and qualifies the general idea of enactivism as a holistic approach
to investigating cognition. We do not claim that architectural
affordances are directly represented as a specific ERP component;
however, we provide evidence for an action–perception account of
Djebbara et al. PNAS Latest Articles | 9 of 10
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cognition, which systematically differentiates according to the
definition of affordances.
As a note for architects, the fact that we are mobile and pre-
dictive beings suggests that architects should take the temporal
aspect as seriously as the spatial aspect, given that the predictive
process of unfolding bodily movement can alter the perception of
space. Moving and transitioning in space is to continuously con-
struct a prediction of a world that we perceive as dependent on
our action potentials, which informs brain, body, and mind. Al-
tering perception would ultimately lead spaces to have a potential
physiological impact on users. Much remains to be uncovered in
architectural cognition.
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